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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In July of 2014, Manuel Noriega—the infamous drug-trafficker, arms dealer, 
and deposed military dictator of Panama1—filed a lawsuit in California state 
court against the video game publisher Activision.  His complaint alleged that 
Activision had violated his “right of publicity” under California law by 
publishing Call of Duty: Black Ops II, a popular video game.2  Black Ops II 
features a character named Manuel Noriega who bears the real Noriega’s 
likeness and is depicted as a brutal murderer. 3  According to Noriega, this use 
of his persona constituted “ ‘blatant misuse, unlawful exploitation and 
misappropriation of plaintiff’s image and likeness for economic gain.’ ”4 
In October 2014, a judge for the Superior Court of California in the County 
of Los Angeles dismissed Noriega’s suit under California’s anti-SLAPP suit 
statute.5  According to the court, Black Ops constituted a “transformative 
work”—meaning Noriega’s likeness was but one small piece of a broader, 
expressive original creation—and was therefore shielded by the First 
Amendment from a right of publicity suit.6  Thus, Activision’s free speech 
rights trumped Noriega’s publicity rights.7  
Though this result is undoubtedly correct, the court’s logic—while 
accurately reflecting the state of the law—is troubling.  Activision was permitted 
to use Noriega’s likeness primarily because his character played a minor, fanciful 
role in a sprawling, imaginative work of fiction.8  In this situation, the 
“transformative work” test constituted a sufficient First Amendment buffer.  It 
is disturbingly easy, however, to imagine a similar situation with a dramatically 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See generally JOHN DINGES, OUR MAN IN PANAMA: HOW GENERAL NORIEGA USED THE 
UNITED STATES-AND MADE MILLIONS IN DRUGS AND ARMS (1990); Simon Hooper, The rise and fall 
of Noriega, Central America’s strongman, CNN (July 7, 2010, 10:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/ 
WORLD/americas/07/07/panama.manuel.noriega.profile/; Seymour M. Hersh, Panama Strongman 
Said to Trade in Drugs, Arms and Illicit Money, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1986/06/12/world/panama-strongman-said-to-trade-in-drugs-arms-and-illicit-money.html. 
 2 Complaint for Damages at 4, Noriega v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 2014 WL 3G11852 CC21 
Super. Ct. 2014 (No. BC 551747). 
 3 Eugene Volokh, Can Manuel Noriega really win his “right of publicity” lawsuit against Activision?, 
WASH. POST (July 17, 2014), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspirac 
y/wp/2014/07/17/can-manuel-noriega-really-win-his-right-of-publicity-lawsuit-against-activision/.  
 4 Complaint for Damages at 4, Noriega v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 2014 WL 3G11852 (C21 
Super. Ct. 2014) (No. BC 551747). 
 5 Order on Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike at 6, Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., 
2014 WL 5930149 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2014). 
 6 Id. at *5.  The nature of the “transformative work” test is discussed at note 63 infra and 
accompanying text. 
 7 Order of Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike at 6, Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., 
2014 WL 5930149 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2014). 
 8 Id. at *5. 
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different outcome.  Noriega’s right of publicity suit was—it seems obvious—an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress suit in disguise.  The former dictator 
was clearly agitated by his portrayal as a madman, not by his portrayal per se.  
His suit failed because his character appeared on screen so briefly.  However, 
this reasoning leaves in question the outcome if the game’s creators had used 
Black Ops II to criticize and mock Noriega more thoroughly and included him as 
a central character.  Under those circumstances, the “transformative work” test 
would have offered no shield; indeed, Noriega may well have won his lawsuit. 
Part II of this Article presents an overview of the history of right of 
publicity claims, explaining how they grew out of, and ultimately detached from, 
the right of privacy.  Part III will explore the unnerving emergence of a new 
breed of right to publicity lawsuits: those designed to censor criticism of, and 
commentary upon, a public official or public figure.  This Part will then 
describe why recent right to publicity rulings fail to protect artists, especially 
video game makers, from lawsuits designed to suppress political speech.  Part 
IV proposes a new legal test to help guard expressive works—especially video 
games—against such suits, even when the works themselves are not legally 
“transformative.”  Finally, Part V explains how the proposed test promotes 
principles and values that lie at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection 
of speech. 
Although this proposed test is novel, its underpinnings are not.  The 
Supreme Court has previously encountered the conundrum of a tort that, while 
neutral on its face, allows public figures to make an end run around the First 
Amendment.  In response, it has imported First Amendment jurisprudence into 
tort law to stymie ingenious attempts by public figures to silence their critics.9  
Courts should perform a similar analysis when faced with a right of publicity 
suit that seems designed to curb free speech.  This analysis becomes especially 
important when a publicity suit targets a video game.  The fact that video games 
have emerged as a favored target of such suits suggests that the very thing that 
makes video games so revolutionarily expressive—their ability to realistically 
depict interactive, fictional worlds—also puts them at a heightened risk of 
censorship under the guise of lawsuits.  
II.  THE MODERN RISE OF PUBLICITY RIGHTS 
The right of publicity is thoroughly modern in every sense of the word.  Its 
philosophical and legal foundations would have been utterly foreign to the 
founding generation, who had no conception of fame as a commercial asset to 
be monetized.  In fact, the Founders seem to have viewed their own fame as “a 
                                                                                                                   
 9 See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
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kind of common republican property,” to be deployed as a means of promoting 
“independence and nation building.”10  Fame for the Founders was not “an 
instrumental good,” but rather a “ ‘final’ good,” valued “for its own sake” as a 
reward for “disinterested civic virtue.”11  
This view of fame was also held by most Americans in the century following 
the founding.  As the civic fame of the Founders broadened into less high-
minded realms, a vibrant celebrity culture flourished among authors and 
performers.12  Although these celebrities’ likenesses were often exploited for 
commercial gain—the names and faces of popular figures adorned a wide array 
of products, from toys and bicycles to furniture and cigars—no corresponding 
“right of publicity” emerged.13  The notion of fame as a “species of common 
property” persisted, even as commercial exploitation skyrocketed.14  
However, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, these 
“unspoken assumption[s]” about one’s right to one’s own image shifted 
dramatically.15  As photography and printing technology grew more 
sophisticated, pictorial advertisements exploded, and famous people began to 
attempt to assert commercial control over their likenesses.16  Predictably, most 
courts rejected these early suits; still, a few prescient courts recognized an 
individual’s proprietary interest in his own identity.17   
A very different theory of publicity rights took center stage, however, as a 
result of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s seminal 1890 article proposing 
the existence of a right to privacy.18  Warren and Brandeis intended the right to 
protect primarily against journalistic intrusiveness and seem not to have 
intended their privacy doctrine to extend to an explicitly proprietary conception 
                                                                                                                   
 10 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. 
L. REV. 127, 150 (1993); see also DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 33 
(Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974); William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare 
War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 736 (1997). 
 11 Madow, supra note 10, at 151. 
 12 See Amy Henderson, From Barnum to “Bling”: The Changing Face of Celebrity Culture, 7 
HEDGEHOG REV. 37, 38 (2005).  
 13 Madow, supra note 10, at 152. 
 14 Neil Harris, Who Owns Our Myths? Heroism and Copyright in an Age of Mass Culture, 52 SOC. RES. 
241, 251 (1985). 
 15 Madow, supra note 10, at 152. 
 16 Id. at 154; see also Samantha Barbas, From Privacy to Publicity: The Tort of Appropriation in the Age 
of Mass Consumption, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1119, 1131–32, 1142–45 (2013). 
 17 See, e.g., Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg., 67 A. 392, 394 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (indicating that “the 
peculiar cast of one’s features is . . . also one’s property” and that “its pecuniary value . . . belong[s] 
to its owner, rather than to the person seeking to make an unauthorized use of it”). 
 18 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
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of one’s identity.19  Yet the first legislature to enshrine a right to privacy in 
statute, New York, turned the concept into an early right of publicity, creating 
criminal and civil liability for the unauthorized use of the “ ‘name, portrait or 
picture’ ” of any living person for “ ‘advertising purposes, or for the purposes 
of trade.’ ”20  Similarly, the first state supreme court to find a common law right 
to privacy21 interpreted this right as a publicity right one that forbade the 
unauthorized use of a person’s picture in advertising.22 
These early successes, however, turned out to be outliers.  Most legislatures 
that codified a right to privacy23—as well as most courts that developed the 
right into common law24—required plaintiffs who alleged a violation to prove 
embarrassment or emotional distress.  But a movie star who sees her face on an 
unauthorized advertisement could hardly claim to be emotionally disturbed, and 
so courts generally rejected the idea of a right of publicity that grew out of 
generalized privacy rights.25  Under one especially popular theory, celebrities 
waived any rights of publicity when they achieved a significant measure of 
fame.26  In one case, the court rejected the publicity rights claim of a famous 
college football player whose image had been used in advertising, without 
permission, by a beer company.27  “[T]he publicity he got,” the court wrote of 
the player, “was only that which he had been constantly seeking and 
receiving.”28  In another case, an actress sued a burlesque theater for placing her 
photograph at its entrance, despite the fact that the actress did not, and had 
never, appeared in any burlesque shows.29  The court ruled against the actress, 
                                                                                                                   
 19 See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1821 (2010); 
Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for A Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 
CORNELL L. REV. 291, 296 (1983). 
 20 Frederick R. Kessler, A Common Law for the Statutory Era: The Right of Publicity and New York’s 
Right of Privacy Statute, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 951, 952 (1986).  This law was passed in response to 
a much-maligned appeals court decision holding that New York State had no common law right 
to privacy.  Id. at 958–61.  The case involved a flour company that had used a minor’s picture—
without her authorization—to sell flour.  Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 
447 (N.Y. 1902). 
 21 See Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right 
to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 642 (2002). 
 22 See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 79–81 (Ga. 1905). 
 23 See. e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. § 2315 (2011); N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS CODE §§ 50–51 
(2011); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 24 See, e.g., Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 164 N.E.2d 853 (N.Y. 1959). 
 25 See, e.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1952).  
 26 See O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941). 
 27 Id.. 
 28 Id. at 170. 
 29 Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, 24 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (W.D. Okla. 1938). 
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finding that, by appearing in films, she had entirely surrendered her right to 
privacy.30 
Other courts developed a slightly more nuanced interpretation of publicity 
rights, holding that only offensive or defamatory misappropriation of celebrity 
likenesses was actionable.31  And some courts that jettisoned the offensiveness 
requirement in establishing a cause of action still preserved it when establishing 
damages.32  In one high-profile case, Zelma Cason sued the author Marjorie 
Kinnan Rawlings for invasion of privacy after Rawlings’s autobiography 
described Cason, using her real forename, as “an ageless spinster resembling an 
angry and efficient canary.”33  The Florida Supreme Court—confronting the 
right of privacy issue for the first time—held that though Cason had sufficiently 
established a cause of action, she could not collect damages because “[t]here 
was no mental anguish—no loss of friends or respect in the community—no 
injury to character or reputation.”34  Tellingly, Cason’s suit had originally 
included a libel claim, which the court threw out.35 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc.,36 however, brought a sea of change in the courts’ conceptualization of 
privacy rights and the right of publicity.  Haelan Laboratories involved a chewing 
gum manufacturer (Haelan) that contracted with a famous baseball player to 
obtain the exclusive right to use his photographs in advertisements.37  Soon 
after, another chewing gum company (Topps) used the same player’s 
photographs to sell its own product.38  Haelan sued Topps for violating the 
right to publicity that it had contractually obtained from the baseball player.39 
Haelan Laboratories presented a thorny legal issue.  Because only individuals 
can hold privacy rights, Haelan could not argue its case under a privacy-based 
theory of the right to publicity.  Instead, Haelan argued that the right to 
publicity is a separate right, related to but not dependent upon privacy, which 
was fundamentally property-based—and could thus be transferred.40  In a 
groundbreaking opinion by Judge Jerome Frank, the court agreed, introducing 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Id. at 1007. 
 31 See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953). 
 32 Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 253 (Fla. 1944). 
 33 Id. at 245. 
 34 Cason v. Baskin, 30 So.2d 635, 640 (Fla. 1947). 
 35 Cason, 20 So. 2d at 253. 
 36 Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 37 Id. at 867. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See id. (“The plaintiff maintains that defendant invaded plaintiff’s exclusive right to use the 
photographs of leading baseball-players.”). 
 40 Id. 
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the phrase “right of publicity” into the legal lexicon for the first time.41  Each of 
us, Judge Frank wrote, holds a publicity value in our own likeness, and that 
value can undoubtedly be licensed or assigned to a third party.  Intriguingly, 
Judge Frank apparently felt compelled to push back against the offensiveness 
requirement already in use in several states, writing: “it is common knowledge 
that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from 
having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would 
feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing 
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, 
magazines, busses, trains and subways.”42 
Accordingly, the court held that a right to publicity exists “in addition to and 
independent of” the right of privacy, and that famous people have “a right in 
the publicity value of [their] photograph[s].”43  Judge Frank did not attempt to 
prove that this right was firmly entrenched at common law.  Instead, he simply 
asserted that such a right must exist, for celebrities would otherwise have few 
legal means by which to control the use of their likeness—and reap the financial 
gain that comes with such use.44  
One year after Haelan Laboratories, Melville Nimmer wrote a widely read 
article45—pitched as something of a sequel to Warren and Brandeis’s 
disquisition46—proposing that courts should recognize a broad right to 
publicity.47  Nimmer interpreted Haelan Laboratories as a “culmination” of a 
growing trend in the courts toward erecting legal protections for individuals’ 
“publicity values,”48 encouraging other courts to adopt Judge Frank’s vision of 
an independent right of publicity.49  Then, in 1960, William Prosser wrote an 
influential article including “misappropriation”—his term for publicity rights—
as one of his four privacy-based torts, adding that the right primarily protects 
                                                                                                                   
 41 Id. at 868; see Martin H. Redish & Kelsey B. Shust, The Right of Publicity and the First 
Amendment in the Modern Age of Commercial Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1443, 1453–54 (2015).  
Judge Frank, however, shrugged off the “immaterial” question of whether publicity rights qualify 
as property rights, writing that “the tag ‘property’ simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a 
claim which has pecuniary worth.”  Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868.  In spite of this dismissive 
dicta, his entire opinion seems to be premised on the notion that the right of publicity is, in fact, a 
property right.  
 42 Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954). 
 46 See id. at 203–04, 223. 
 47 Id. at 216. 
 48 Id. at 204. 
 49 See id. at 222–23 (describing Haelan Laboratories decision as “persuasive” and “a major step in 
the inexorable process of reconciling law and contemporary problems”). 
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“property” interests.50  When Prosser later served as the Chief Reporter of the 
Second Restatement of Torts, he codified “misappropriation” in the 
Restatement, more explicitly describing the protected right as “in the nature of a 
property right.”51 
The same year that the Second Restatement was released, the Supreme 
Court held in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.52 that the general 
principle of publicity rights passed First Amendment scrutiny.53  Following  
Zacchini, as an increasing number of courts accepted Prosser’s conception of 
misappropriation54—and an increasing number of legislatures passed laws 
codifying this right into statute55—the right to publicity gained widespread 
acceptance throughout the country.56  
                                                                                                                   
 50 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 401–07 (1960).  According to Prosser, the 
three other torts comprising the law of privacy are intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of 
private facts, and false light.  Id. at 389.  Some commentators believe that Prosser may have 
considered misappropriation to be less tethered to the right of privacy than the other three torts.  
See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 191, 193 (1983). 
 51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1977). 
 52 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 53 Zacchini involved an entertainer whose fame lay in his “human cannonball” act, which lasted 
only about fifteen seconds.  Id. at 563.  A reporter filmed the entirety of Zacchini’s act and sold 
the footage to a broadcasting company, which aired it on television.  Id. at 564.  Zacchini sued, 
claiming that the broadcasting company had violated his publicity rights by televising the entirety 
of his signature act.  Id.  A majority of the Supreme Court agreed, focusing on the fact that, by 
disseminating footage of Zacchini’s act to the public, the broadcasting company had reduced 
Zacchini’s economic incentive to perform the act in the future.  Id. at 576.  Thus, the Court 
seemed to conceptualize the right of publicity as a fundamentally proprietary one.  In a vigorous 
dissent, Justice Powell argued that the First and Fourteenth Amendments should have barred 
Zacchini’s suit.  Id. at 579–82 (Powell, J., dissenting).  Zacchini, then, shows that the right of 
publicity does not inherently violate the First Amendment.  However, it should be noted that the 
judgment in Zacchini was exceedingly narrow, focusing only on instances in which a performer’s 
entire act was broadcast without the performer’s authorization.  See id. at 576. 
 54 See, e.g., Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 647 (Cal. 1994); Felsher v. Univ. 
of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 593 (Ind. 2001); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 
236 (Minn. 1998). 
 55 See Robert M. Connallon, Comment, An Integrative Alternative for America’s Privacy Torts, 38 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 71, 79 (2007) (collecting statutes). 
 56 See Alicia M. Hunt, Everyone Wants to Be A Star: Extensive Publicity Rights for Noncelebrities Unduly 
Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1605, 1615 (2001); Eleanor Johnson, Note, Henley v. 
Dillard Department Stores: Don Loves His Henley, and Has A Right to It Too, 45 VILL. L. REV. 169, 
180–81 (2000).  
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III.  THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S EMERGING THREAT TO CRITICAL SPEECH 
Over two dozen states currently recognize some form of the right of 
publicity—some by statute, some by common law, some by both.57  California 
protects publicity rights through both common law and statute.58  The basic 
components of this right are somewhat similar in every state, though they 
occasionally vary in significant ways.59  California’s statutory right of publicity 
contains these fundamental elements: 
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, 
merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, 
or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or 
services, without such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable 
for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a 
result thereof.60   
Recognizing the dangers that an overly broad right of publicity could pose 
to the First Amendment, various courts have struggled to create a test that 
balances publicity interests with free speech rights.  These tests fall into roughly 
                                                                                                                   
 57 See Laura Hock, Note, What’s in a Name? Fred Goldman’s Quest to Acquire O.J. Simpson’s Right of 
Publicity and the Suit’s Implications for Celebrities, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 347, 355 n.43 (2008). 
 58 Timed Out, LLC v. Youabian, Inc., 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 776 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing 
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001)). 
 59 Leaving aside free speech issues, there are two main areas in which right of publicity laws 
usually differ.  The first is inheritability—i.e., should an individual’s right of publicity be 
transmissible to one’s heirs?  See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. 
Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231, 
1235 (N.D. Ohio 1983).  The second is the breadth of the right—i.e., how much of an 
individual’s persona can be used before the right of publicity is triggered?  See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 
447 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1978).  Although the inheritability question divided states 
for several decades, most states today recognize publicity rights as inheritable.  See, e.g., Bell v. 
Foster, 2013 WL 6229174, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga. 2013); In re Estate of Reynolds, 235 Ariz. 80, 84 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).  That is because the right has come to be seen as proprietary (and thus 
transmissible) rather than moral (and thus individualized).  See Toffoloni v. LFP Publishing 
Group, LLC, 572 F. 3d 1201, 1207 (11th Cir. 2009); Bell v. Foster, 2013 WL 6229174, at *6 (N.D. 
Ga. 2013); Reynolds, 235 Ariz. at 83.  There is not yet a consensus, however, as to how broad the 
right should be.  Compare Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that 
New York’s right of publicity law to a literal “portrait” or “picture” and does not encompass a 
general likeness), and Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that Michigan’s right of publicity law includes an extremely broad definition of 
“likeness” that includes a famous person’s catchphrases).  
 60 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (amended 1985). 
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five categories.  The first, which might be called the CBC test,61 asks whether 
the defendant’s likeness has been used explicitly to sell a product; if it has, the 
right of publicity claim may proceed.  The second, which might be called the 
core speech test, asks whether the defendant’s likeness has been used in news, 
entertainment, creative works, or political contexts; if it has, the right of 
publicity claim must fail.62  Although these tests are commendably protective of 
speech, neither has gained much currency in recent years. 
The third test, commonly called the “transformative work” test, asks 
whether a work uses the plaintiff’s likeness as merely one piece of a much 
broader work; if it does, the right of publicity claim must fail.63  The fourth test, 
the “transformative use” test, asks whether the celebrity’s likeness itself has been 
distorted or altered; if it has not, the right of publicity claim may proceed.64  
The fifth and final test, the “predominant use” test, asks whether the use of 
the defendant’s likeness has a predominantly expressive purpose.65  If not, and 
the purpose is predominantly commercial, the right of publicity claim may 
proceed.66  This test allows strikingly little breathing room for freedom of 
                                                                                                                   
 61 See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818 
(8th Cir. 2007).  In C.B.C., the Eighth Circuit held that online fantasy baseball products’ use of 
baseball players’ names and statistics may violate those players’ common law right of publicity.  
See id. at 822–23.  However, the court decided that the First Amendment barred these players 
from bringing suit because the information resided in the public domain.  Id. at 823.  The court 
rejected the notion that, because the players’ information was used by an entertainment company 
seeking a profit, the fantasy baseball website’s First Amendment interests were diminished.  Id.  
Accordingly, under the C.B.C. ruling, the Eighth Circuit now permits right of publicity claims 
only against defendants who used a person’s likeness for explicitly—and exclusively—commercial 
purposes, as in advertising.  See id. at 824. 
 62 See Hart v. Elect. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2013); World Wrestling Fed’n 
Entm’t Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 426 (W.D. Pa. 2003); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995).  
 63 See Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2013); Bosley v. 
Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (N.D. Ohio 2004); World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t Inc. v. 
Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 426 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
 64 See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1273–76 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
 65 See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003). 
 66 See id. at 369.  TCI is arguably another instance of a famous person using a right of publicity 
lawsuit in order to circumvent the First Amendment concerns that would be present in a false 
light or intentional infliction of emotional distress suit.  The case involved Tony Twist, a 
professional hockey player who sued Todd McFarlane for including a murderous character 
named Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli in his comic book Spawn.  Tony Twist and Twistelli bore 
no physical resemblance—their only analogue was their “tough guy persona”—and Spawn was 
undoubtedly an expressive work.  Id. at 366.  Still, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment did not bar Twist’s right of publicity suit against McFarlane.  Id. at 374. 
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expression and has been rejected by most courts that have had occasion to 
consider it.67 
In recent years, courts have generally relied upon the third or fourth tests—
transformative work or transformative use—when dealing with right of 
publicity in video game lawsuits.68  The transformative use test in particular has 
risen to prominence in a number of jurisdictions, though this test significantly 
cramps expression and has led to some questionable results.  In one case, a 
California court allowed members of the band No Doubt to sue Activision for 
including lifelike avatars in one of its video games—despite the fact that the No 
Doubt avatars constituted a tiny fraction of the many characters from which 
viewers could choose.69  In another case, the California Supreme Court held 
that an artist’s creation and sale of t-shirts and prints featuring charcoal 
renderings of the Three Stooges had no First Amendment protections against a 
right of publicity suit.70  And in two prominent cases, the Third and Ninth 
Circuits used versions of the test to hold that former NCAA college football 
players could sue Electronic Arts for including their avatars in a video game that 
featured hundreds of other avatars.71 
The NCAA and No Doubt cases are particularly troubling because they 
suggest that one of video games’ chief virtues—their ability to closely replicate 
reality in a digital medium—also opens them up to legal liability.  Had 
Activision produced a movie featuring a scene at a No Doubt concert (and 
depicted the band through lookalikes), it probably would have been immune 
from a suit.  Likewise, had Electronic Arts produced a graphic novel with a 
chapter set at a college football game, with illustrated players clearly modeled 
after real-world athletes, the First Amendment would likely have shielded it 
from suit.  But because these companies produced video games with 
                                                                                                                   
 67 Michael Feinberg, Comment, A Collision Course Between the Right of Publicity and the First 
Amendment: The Third and Ninth Circuit Find EA Sports’s NCAA Football Video Games Infringe Former 
Student-Athletes Right of Publicity, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 175, 195 (2014); Redish & Shust, supra 
note 41, at 1476.  
 68 See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 
(9th Cir. 2013) (transformative use); Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 164 
(transformative use); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011) (transformative use); Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 616 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2006) (transformative work). 
 69 See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 400–01 (2011). 
 70 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
 71 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1273–76 
(9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Electronic Arts, 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).  The avatars did not bear the 
players’ actual names or their true hometowns.  In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1271.  They did, 
however, bear the players’ jersey number and physical characteristics.  Id. at 1271–72; Hart, 717 
F.3d at 146. 
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meticulously rendered, lifelike details, they found themselves open to right of 
publicity lawsuits. 
Legally speaking, there is no clear reason why the right of publicity should 
apply more vigorously to realistic, lifelike representations than it does to less 
realistic, approximate representations where both representations are a part of 
an expressive work.  And images constitute only one aspect of the law; in 
California, even the use of a famous person’s name may be enough to trigger a 
right to publicity claim.72  Yet video games have recently emerged as a prime 
target for right of publicity suits.  One reason for this trend may be that, until 
the Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,73 
the First Amendment protections granted to video games were unclear.74  But it 
appears more likely that, because they may replicate a famous person’s likeness 
so precisely, video games seem, to many plaintiffs, like a more aggressive and 
intrusive offense against their right to publicity. 
The inroads on protection of expression resulting from these lower court 
rulings threaten to lay the groundwork for the use of publicity rights to silence 
criticism.  Under a transformative use test, Manuel Noriega’s suit against 
Activision would have almost certainly succeeded.  Black Ops II’s creators did 
nothing to distort or alter Noriega’s image.  Indeed, part of their artistic 
achievement was to depict his face with utmost realism.  Perversely, though, 
this artistic achievement constitutes a legal liability.  By faithfully rendering 
Noriega’s image Activision opened itself up to a right of publicity lawsuit.  This 
fact alone illustrates why the transformative use test poses such a significant 
threat to fundamental First Amendment values.  
Under a transformative work test, on the other hand, Noriega’s suit was 
hopeless from the start. His character has only a brief role in Black Ops II.  His 
screen time is limited, and his character has little bearing on the broader work.  
Thus, examining Black Ops II as a whole under the transformative work test, the 
California Superior Court properly held that Noriega’s suit must fail.75 
Nevertheless, the transformative work test cannot always serve as such a 
sturdy First Amendment buffer.  To understand why, consider this 
hypothetical.  Activision develops a new game titled Noriega: A Madman Returns 
in which the Noriega character takes a star turn.  The game allows viewers to 
play the role of an undercover CIA operative infiltrating Noriega’s inner circle 
in order to halt his murderous activities.  In promotional materials, Activision 
explains that the game is intended to serve as a sharply critical condemnation of 
                                                                                                                   
 72 See WEST ANN. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (amended 1985). 
 73 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 74 See infra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. 
 75 Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., Cal. Super. Trial Order, Los Angeles County, Oct. 27, 
2014.  
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Noriega’s appalling misdeeds. By drawing players into Noriega’s web of 
madness and allowing them to interact with the psychopaths who inhabit this 
horrific, deranged world, the game strips away the veneer of glamour that 
sometimes glazes the criminal lifestyle.  Instead, players must make a series of 
moral decisions and practical sacrifices in order to accomplish their ultimate 
mission. 
The transformative work test would provide no protection to this 
hypothetical game, nor would the transformative use test.  If Noriega had 
brought a right of publicity suit against the creators of this hypothetical game, 
he likely would have won it.  The game, after all, uses his unaltered image and 
features him as a central character.  He would have a strong case under both the 
transformative work and the transformative use tests.  It would not matter that 
A Madman Returns is an expressive work that harnesses the interactive nature of 
the video game medium to deepen the artists’ criticism and intensify its impact.  
It would not matter that Noriega’s actual grievance is that Activision depicted 
him in a harshly negative light.  His suit would be, in essence, an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress suit in disguise—and he would very likely win it.  
This flaw in the transformative work test poses a problem; it is, however, a 
fixable one.  
IV.  THE PROPOSED TEST 
Borrowing concepts from intellectual property law and First Amendment 
jurisprudence, we propose a new test for courts to perform when faced with a 
right of publicity lawsuit.76  Initially, the court should pose two threshold 
inquiries.  As in First Amendment defamation doctrine, the first of these 
inquiries should ask whether the plaintiff is one of two types of public figures: 
all-purpose or limited-purpose.77  To qualify as an all-purpose public figure, a 
plaintiff must be widely known and discussed78 (e.g., a movie star, a famous 
athlete, or a well-known business leader).79 To qualify as a limited-purpose 
                                                                                                                   
 76 Although this Article specifically examines intentional infliction of emotional distress 
lawsuits dressed in the guise of publicity rights, the test we articulate is equally applicable to other 
lawsuits.  Defamation suits, for example, may be easily dressed in the garb of publicity rights, as 
may false light suits. 
 77 See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (describing these categories for purposes of 
determining evidentiary burden placed on defamation plaintiffs). 
 78 See id. at 351 (noting that some individuals achieve “such pervasive fame or notoriety” that 
they become public figures for all purposes and contexts). 
 79 See Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1253–54 (5th Cir. 1980); Carson v. Allied 
News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976); James C. Mitchell, The Accidental Purist: Reclaiming the 
Gertz All Purpose Public Figure Doctrine in the Age of “Celebrity Journalism,” 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 
559, 573–74 (2002). 
13
Stern and Stern: A New Test to Reconcile the Right of Publicity with Core First Am
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2015
106 J. INTELL. PROP. L.  [Vol. 23:93 
 
public figure, a plaintiff must have thrust herself “to the forefront of particular 
public controversies” in order to influence debate.80  
If the plaintiff is not an all-purpose public figure or limited-purpose public 
figure, the court should simply move on to the transformative work test.  If the 
plaintiff does qualify as a public figure, however, the court should proceed to 
the second threshold inquiry.  That threshold inquiry asks whether criticizing, 
mocking, or commenting upon the plaintiff is a significant purpose of the 
work.81  If not, the court should move on to the transformative work test.  If 
the work is deemed to have such a purpose, the court should proceed to the 
test outlined below.  
If the plaintiff is some breed of public figure, and the work can reasonably 
be viewed as criticizing or commenting on the plaintiff, the court should then 
ask three questions.  The first of these asks whether the work presents a false 
statement of fact about the defendant made with actual malice—i.e., knowledge 
of the statement’s falsity or reckless disregard for whether it was true.82  This 
prong explicitly draws from the Supreme Court’s decision in Hustler Magazine, 
Inc. v. Falwell,83 in which the Court imported the actual malice standard from 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan84 into tort law in order to forestall disguised 
intentional infliction of emotional distress suits.85  In “the world of debate 
about public affairs,” speech that is harshly disparaging, even when “motivated 
by hatred or ill-will . . . [or] bad motive,” must be granted First Amendment 
protection.86 Expression that might be censorable if it targeted private persons 
                                                                                                                   
 80 These categories are borrowed from Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).  Gertz 
reaffirmed that the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), that 
the actual malice standard applies to public officials bringing libel suits, Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342–43, 
and, as a matter of logic and coherence, public officials should be treated like public figures for 
the purposes of the test we propose.  As a practical matter, we doubt that the plaintiff’s status as a 
public official would prove independently decisive.  If a public official were sufficiently known to 
have a colorable right of publicity in the first place, then she would presumably qualify as a public 
figure as well. 
 81 This is not to say that the entire work must be devoted to criticizing the defendant.  Rather, 
this inquiry asks whether the defendant has used the plaintiff’s likeness as a means of criticizing 
him.  For example, Activision’s use of Noriega’s likeness was extremely limited—but was also 
clearly intended to criticize.  Thus, Activision’s use would satisfy this inquiry.  
 82 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (defining actual malice as a 
standard that public officials must meet in defamation suits). 
 83 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 84 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 85 Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56 (ruling that public figures and public officials must show 
defendant published false statement of fact with actual malice in order to recover for the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress).  
 86 Id. at 53; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (overturning verdict for emotional 
infliction of emotional distress notwithstanding that defendant’s picketing had “inflict[ed] great 
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is shielded by the First Amendment when it pertains to “public debate about 
public figures.”87  
The second question asks whether a reasonable person would think that the 
plaintiff endorsed the work or licensed the use of his image.  This prong seeks 
to protect plaintiffs who may have a genuine grievance with companies that 
have misappropriated their likeness to sell its product.  It is critical to note that, 
despite its occasional misapplication, the right of publicity is a fundamentally 
sound means of protecting an individual’s control over his own likeness.  A 
recent lawsuit brought by Michael Jordan neatly demonstrates the right’s 
continued utility.  In 2009, the supermarket chain Dominick’s Finer Foods ran 
an advertisement congratulating Jordan on his induction into the Basketball 
Hall of Fame and offering a $2 coupon for steak.  The ad included the phrase 
“Michael Jordan . . . You are a cut above.”88  Dominick’s did not ask Jordan for 
permission to use his name, despite the fact that its ad arguably implied that he 
had endorsed its steaks.89  Jordan sued, and a Chicago jury awarded him $8.9 
million in damages.90  Without state protection of his publicity rights, Jordan 
may not have been able to protect his name and identity against such purely 
commercial exploitation with de minimis expressive value.  Jordan’s suit 
illustrates that in evaluating this prong of the test, courts should especially focus 
on the use of the plaintiff’s likeness in advertising or promotional materials.  If 
a video game’s marketing campaign centers around a public figure’s image, 
without any clear critical or parodic intent, this prong may be satisfied.  
The third question asks whether the defendant’s work is likely to impede the 
defendant’s ability to profit from his image.  Allowing famous individuals to 
profit off their own celebrity is a fundamental underpinning of the right to 
publicity.91  This prong does not inquire into whether the defendant’s work was 
                                                                                                                   
pain,” id. at 1220, on plaintiff, where pickets “addressed matters of public import on public 
property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials,” id.). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Arthur Weinstein, Michael Jordan awarded $8.9M in civil suit against supermarket, SPORTING 
NEWS, Aug. 21, 2015, available at http://www.sportingnews.com/nba/story/2015-08-21/michael-
jordan-awarded-89-million-in-civil-suit-against-chicago-supermarket.  
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).  A 
similar right is also a pillar of broader intellectual property law, such as copyright law.  See 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576  (1994) (noting that whether or not an 
alleged infringement of copyright impedes the plaintiff’s ability to profit off his own work is a 
central prong of fair use analysis).  A major difference between the two rights is that copyright 
rests more heavily on the rationale of economic incentive.  Compare Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By establishing a marketable right to the use of 
one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”), 
with White v. Samsung, 971 F.2d at 1399 (“The law protects the celebrity’s sole right to exploit 
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so effective in criticizing the plaintiff that no one would want to buy a product 
that the plaintiff endorses.  Rather, this prong asks whether the defendant has 
capitalized upon a portion of the market that rightfully belongs to the plaintiff.  
For instance, if the defendant produces a video game that allows the character 
to assume the role of a famous singer who has not authorized the use of her 
likeness, this prong may be satisfied. 
An application of this test to the hypothetical Noriega video game described 
above illustrates its utility.  Noriega is, as a former military dictator and 
notorious international criminal, undoubtedly a public figure.  Moreover, the 
hypothetical video game would obviously be using Noriega’s likeness to criticize 
his brutality and avarice.  Thus, the two threshold inquiries would be satisfied. 
Moving onto the three-prong test, the makers of the hypothetical game 
would almost assuredly not be putting forth false statements of fact about 
Noriega with actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth.  Rather, the 
expressive, creative nature of the video game medium would make clear to 
players that the game was an imaginative fantasy about what Noriega’s bloody 
rule could have looked like—not a fact-based statement of any sort.  Further, no 
reasonable person would think that Noriega, who pled not guilty to the federal 
charges against him,92 licensed his image to the makers of the hypothetical 
game.  Noriega maintained his innocence throughout his trial and resulting 
prison sentence.93  He would surely not authorize his image to be used in a 
video game that depicted him as a madman.  Finally, the hypothetical game 
would probably not capitalize upon a portion of the market that rightfully 
belongs to Noriega, since, as previously discussed, Noriega would presumably 
never license a video game so deeply critical of him.  At a minimum, the burden 
would rest heavily on Noriega to demonstrate that such a game undercut his 
own efforts to capitalize on his notoriety. 
V.  VINDICATING FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS  
The test we propose may complicate certain right of publicity lawsuits.  
However, it would also bring a welcome clarity to cases that seem to pit the 
right of publicity against freedom of speech.  It is worth explaining briefly why 
this clarity is so vital. 
                                                                                                                   
this value whether the celebrity has achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a 
combination thereof.”). 
 92 James LeMoyne, A Thin Paper Trail in Noreiga Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1990, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/10/us/a-thin-paper-trail-in-noriega-inquiry.html. 
 93 See Noriega Fights His Conviction in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1996/12/05/us/noriega-fights-his-conviction-in-drug-case.html. 
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The Supreme Court has recognized the potential for a clash between 
intellectual property and free expression at least since International News Service v. 
Associated Press94 nearly a century ago, where the defendant news agency had 
reproduced the plaintiff agency’s posted news as the defendant’s own.  Recent 
Court decisions demonstrate the persistence of this tension.95  With the 
profusion of creative expression spurred by proliferating media, this struggle 
will doubtless arise with increasing frequency as expressive works borrow and 
build upon ideas that originated elsewhere.  
Admittedly, courts have sent mixed messages with regard to the importance 
of placing First Amendment limitations on intellectual property claims.  In 
Eldred v. Ashcroft,96 the Supreme Court dismissed, almost out of hand, the 
argument that extending copyright terms could cause serious speech-related 
harms in violation of the First Amendment.97  And in 2003, the influential 
Judge Richard Posner wrote that “[d]isputes over intellectual property . . . are 
not profitably conducted in the idiom of the First Amendment.  They are the 
subject of specialized bodies of law regulating intellectual property.”98  
Nevertheless, the right of publicity doubtless implicates at least to some 
degree a central principle of the First Amendment.  As the Court recently 
reaffirmed, “[c]ontent-based laws . . . are presumptively unconstitutional and 
may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to 
serve compelling state interests.”99  By its own terms, the right of publicity 
regulates the content of speech.100  Granted, countervailing considerations 
associated with intellectual property support a level of review less stringent than 
the strict scrutiny applied when government seeks to suppress the 
communicative impact of ideas and information.  Still, the need for searching 
judicial inquiry to prevent content-based regulations from chilling or punishing 
constitutionally protected expression does not disappear altogether when the 
interest in reaping gains from one’s fame is involved. 
Indeed, some prominent judges have advocated stronger First Amendment 
protection against intellectual property claims.  Perhaps most notably, Ninth 
                                                                                                                   
 94 248 U.S. 215 (1918).  
 95 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 891–92 (2012) (considering whether a treaty removing 
certain foreign works from the public domain violates the First Amendment); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (considering whether an extension of federal copyright protection 
unconstitutionally trenches upon free expression). 
 96 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 97 Id. at 218. 
 98 McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2003).  
 99 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (citations omitted). 
 100 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903, 912 n.35 
(2003) (“The right of publicity is clearly content-based: It prohibits the unlicensed use of 
particular content (people’s names or likenesses).”). 
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Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski has penned two widely discussed opinions in 
which he argued for strong First Amendment limitations on both right of 
publicity and trademark claims.  In one well-known case, Kozinski dissented 
from a ruling that allowed Vanna White to sue Samsung for misappropriating 
her image after the company made a commercial humorously featuring a White-
like robot in a blonde wig.101  In Kozinski’s mind, White’s suit dangerously 
undermined Samsung’s freedom of expression. 
 I can’t see how giving White the power to keep others from 
evoking her image in the public’s mind can be squared with the 
First Amendment.  Where does White get this right to control 
our thoughts?  The majority’s creation goes way beyond the 
protection given a trademark or a copyrighted work or a person’s 
name or likeness.  All those things control one particular way of 
expressing an idea, one way of referring to an object or a person.  
But not allowing any means of reminding people of someone?  
That’s a speech restriction unparalleled in First Amendment 
law.102 
These concerns should be heightened in the realm of video games, which 
are not commercial speech, but pure expression, as the Court affirmed in Brown 
v. Entertainment Merchants Association.103  In Brown, the Court dispensed with any 
notion that video games might merit lesser First Amendment protection: 
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, 
video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—
through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, 
dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the 
medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world).  
That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.104  
The Court’s holding in Brown resonates powerfully in the arena of right of 
publicity suits against video game makers.  Many of these companies have 
produced video games that “communicate ideas” and “messages” to viewers 
that fall squarely within the realm of speech most fiercely protected by the 
Court’s lawsuit attempted to silence criticism of a dictator and criminal; other 
                                                                                                                   
 101 White v. Samsung, 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 102 Id. at 1519 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 103 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 104 Id. at 2733. 
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suits may endeavor to muffle sardonic commentary upon celebrities.105  Either 
way, the apparent purpose of these suits—to curtail public discourse by 
abridging video game companies’ freedom of expression—contradicts First 
Amendment fundamental values.  
There may be an initial inclination to dismiss the constitutional importance 
of expression like Black Ops II, which combines violent entertainment with 
political commentary.  As the Supreme Court explained in Brown, however, “it is 
difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try”106 
when determining the appropriate protection for speech.  Moreover, right of 
publicity claims by public figures are especially likely to implicate matters of 
public importance, since the plaintiff himself is involved in public or political 
affairs.  Political speech, of course, “is central to the meaning and the purpose 
of the First Amendment”107 and lies “at the core of our . . . First Amendment 
freedoms.”108  The Constitution affords political expression “unequivocal 
protection.”109  Such is its import that political speech must be given “breathing 
space”110 to prevent any “chilling effect”111 by threatened litigation.  Similarly, as 
Chief Justice Warren explained when the Court extended the actual malice 
standard to public figure libel plaintiffs, a similar rationale applies to expression 
about those individuals as well.  Because these figures often wield power and 
influence comparable to that of officeholders, application of the actual malice 
standard helps to safeguard the public’s right to “be informed on matters of 
legitimate interest.”112  The current framework protecting public figures’ right of 
                                                                                                                   
 105 For example, the actress Lindsay Lohan—who has been mired in legal problems for years as 
her acting career has declined precipitously, see Associated Press, Lindsay Lohan’s Court Saga by the 
Numbers, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/28/lindsay-lohan-court-saga-num 
bers_n_7461614.html (last visited May 28, 2015)—sued Rockstar Games and Take Two 
Interactive for including a Lohan-esque character in Grand Theft Auto V.  The character, who 
appears only briefly but seems to bear some similarities to Lohan, is humorously depicted as a 
witless, fame-obsessed fool.  See Abigail Elise, Lindsay Lohan “GTA 5” Lawsuit: Actress Adding 
Charges Against Rockstar Games For Alleged Character Likeness, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2014), 
available at http://www.ibtimes.com/lindsay-lohan-gta-5-lawsuit-actress-adding-charges-against-r 
ockstar-games-alleged-1703225.  The character’s likeness was also used in some promotional 
materials. Id. 
 106 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733. 
 107 Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010).  
 108 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23, 32 (1968)). 
 109 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 58 (1982). 
 110 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
 111 Brown, 456 U.S. at 61. 
 112 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163–65 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring); see Harry 
Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 
267, 275–78 (explaining how Chief Justice Warren’s opinion proved pivotal on a splintered 
Court). 
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publicity fails to provide the breathing space needed to preserve robust 
commentary on those whose actions and words exert a powerful impact on 
society.  Its potential to chill political expression and other commentary on 
public matters is strong, and must be met by an equally strong First 
Amendment counterweight.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Black Ops II, Activision intended to make a critical statement about 
Manuel Noriega.  Noriega did not appreciate this depiction of him, and so he 
did what people who wish to be free from criticism have done for centuries: he 
sued.  Had Noriega challenged Activision with an intentional inflection of 
emotional distress claim, his odds of prevailing would have been negligible.  
However, because Noriega filed a right of publicity claim, he stood a real 
chance of winning his suit.  Indeed, had Noriega filed in the Ninth Circuit 
rather than in California state court, he probably would have won.113 
The test set forth in this Article is designed to prevent close calls like this 
one by creating a clearly delineated framework through which to analyze 
potentially censorious right to publicity claims.  First, the court should ask 
whether the plaintiff is any breed of public figure.  If he is not, the court should 
proceed with a transformative work test.  If he is, the court should ask whether 
the expression in question undertakes to criticize or comment upon the 
plaintiff.  If not, the court should proceed with a transformative work test.  If 
so, the court should ask three questions.  First, does the work present a false 
statement made with actual malice?  Second, would a reasonable person believe 
that the plaintiff endorsed the use of his likeness in this work?  Third, might the 
defendant’s work impede the plaintiff’s ability to profit from his own image?  If 
the answer to all these questions is no, the court should reject the lawsuit as an 
effort to punish and chill constitutionally protected speech. 
Public figures should not be permitted to circumvent the First Amendment 
through a loophole in intellectual property law.  Noriega may have a limited 
right over his own image, but the rest of us have a right to engage critically with 
his legacy.  That his face appeared in a video game—rather than his name 
appearing in a book—should not nullify First Amendment protection.  
Expression does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is 
accessed through a video game console. 
                                                                                                                   
 113  This is because, as previously noted, the Ninth Circuit uses a transformative use test, see 
supra note 71 and accompanying text, and Noriega’s actual image was not notably altered. 
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